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Internship Experiences, The Law


By: Hanoon Vahab, 3rd Year, BBA LLB, Geeta Institute of Law.

Name and Address of the organisation:



Duration of the internship:

03-01-2020 to 14-01-2020

Skills required for application:

You should be well versed with law subjects to apply for the internship, but if you have good communication skills in English, that will have an upper hand.

Application procedure:

Prospective interns may get selected by interviews, in case of selection you have to submit your CV and on the basis of your CV and interview, they will contact you and will provide the details

Working environment:

His internship provided me with exposure to both the District and High Court. The work looked daunting at first but the advocates under whom I was interning were very helpful and helped us understand the different aspects of litigation field.

Roles and Responsibilities:

  • Reading and analysing the given cases.
  • Attending  court sessions
  • Drafting complaint and will 
  • Doing research work on ongoing cases.

Experience of Interacting with seniors:

Chiragh sir was always helpful and approachable, always ready to solve any doubt we had. Be it regarding the bare acts or the procedural formalities. What I learned in this internship is that there is a huge difference between the practical and theoretical aspects of the legal profession.

Overall Experience: 

The overall experience was great, with the great support and guidance my drafting and research ability skills improved a lot, and I understood the importance of practical and theoretical knowledge.

By attending sessions in courts, I learned how to behave in courts and what the proceedings in the court are; and sir taught me the importance of being patient, calm and witty at the same time.

This internship helped me to boost my confidence and helped me to know how hard I need to work to achieve my goals.

Case Reviews, The Law

The Schrems II Judgement: The Implications of Invalidating the E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield Arrangement

The privacy shield arrangement is a framework allowing the companies to transfer personal data from the European Union (“EU”) to the United States (“US”). This article analyses the ruling of the CJEU in the Schrems II case and lays down its implications on the international data transfer regime.

By: Shail Maheshwari, KIIT, School of Law.


On 16th July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) unexpectedly declared the E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield arrangement as invalid in its judgement, Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., Maximilian Schrems (“Schrems II”). The privacy shield arrangement is a framework allowing the companies to transfer personal data from the European Union (“EU”) to the United States (“US”). The decision of the CJEU means that those companies which seek to transfer the personal data of EU customers to the US have to now solely rely on EU sanctioned legal contracts i.e. Standard Contractual Clauses (“SCC”), which the court held as valid in this judgement.

The Schrems II judgment is a companion to the earlier judgment of the CJEU i.e. Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (“Schrems I”) which invalidated the E.U.-U.S. Safe Harbour Arrangement which was the predecessor to the privacy shield arrangement.

An Analysis of the Schrems II Judgment

In 2013, the complainant Maximilian Schrems, a privacy activist, had first complained to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (“DPC”) with regards to Facebook’s data transfer practices.

The complaint primarily concerned the alleged use of SCC by Facebook for data transfer of EU based Facebook users to the US leaving the personal data of users vulnerable to surveillance programs of the US government.

Thus, he sought suspension of data transfer via Facebook pursuant to SCC.

After the complaint was rejected by the DPC, Schrems approached the Irish High Court. The Irish High Court referred various questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. Out of various questions which were referred the two most important questions were 

  1. whether SCCs are valid under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (“charter”)?
  2. whether the EU-US Privacy Shield ensures adequate protection under Article 45 of the General Data Protection Regulations (“GDPR”)?

Validity of SCCs

The CJEU in its ruling clarified the applicability of the GDPR to the transfer of personal data by an economic operator for commercial purposes. It further observed that an economic operator can transfer personal data only if it is established in a member state. However, the level of data protection should be equivalent to that which is guaranteed within the EU by the GDPR in light of the charter.

Upholding the validity of SCCs, it was stated by the CJEU that the level of data protection guaranteed by the SCC will include two important considerations:

  1. Contractual clause as agreed between the data exporter established in the EU and the recipient of the transfer established in the third country.
  2. Any access by the public authorities of that third country to which the data is transferred, the relevant aspects of the legal system of that third country.

Validity of the Privacy Shield

The CJEU determined the validity of Decision 2016/1250 (“the Privacy Shield decision”) in light of the adequacy of protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield. The privacy shield had been in force since 2016 and also imposes certain restrictions on the U.S. government to access EU citizen data. Many companies in the U.S. had relied on it to receive personal information from the E.U.

Since 2018, with the introduction of GDPR, there has been an increase in the level of data protection, and for companies located in the U.S., complying with the protection standard of privacy shield did not necessarily mean being GDPR compliant.

In light of the facts of the Schrems case, the CJEU invalidated the EU-US privacy shield under its “adequacy decision”  power provided by Article 45(2)(a) of the GDPR which states that such a decision can be made in light of  “the rule of law, including national security and the access of public authorities to personal data as well as effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal data is being transferred.”

Accordingly, the CJEU laid down the main reasons for invalidating the privacy shield as follows:

  1. CJEU stated that the privacy shield’s protections were not “essentially equivalent” to those required by the EU law as “the surveillance programs based on those provisions are not limited to what is strictly necessary.”
  2. The provisions of the privacy shield did not grant “data subjects actionable rights before the courts against the U.S. authorities.”
  3. The body created to handle complaints lacked independence “to adopt decisions that are binding on the U.S. Intelligence services.”

The Implications of the Schrems II judgment

The implications of the judgment have been discussed with respect to first the impact on transatlantic data flows and second the global impact.

Impact on transatlantic data flows– The CJEU has not laid down any transition period required for the companies to adjust and comply with the change in data protection norms. Thus, the companies who rely on the data flow from the EU have been unclear with regards to the implications of the decision on their business. The United States Secretary of Commerce highlighted this concern in his statement following the Schrems II decision.

He stated that “data flows are essential not just to tech companies- but to businesses of all sizes in every sector. As our economies continue their post-COVID-19 recovery, it is critical that companies including more than 53000 privacy shield participants are able to transfer data without interruption.”

It is from this statement that it is clear that the decision impacts not only large organizations like Amazon, Google, Facebook, etc. but also smaller organizations that now have to either rely on a new data transfer mechanism or the SCCs. Thus, companies will have to look for alternatives to carry out transactions like storing documents on cloud-hosted servers, sending emails, etc. 

Further, these alternatives, primarily in the form of SCCs can be evaluated and challenged by the EU regulators on a case-by-case basis and can be invalidated if they do not comply with GDPR.

The Global Impact of the decision The decision is significant from the global perspective as it reinforces the importance of user data protection in international commerce. It also lays down a rigorous data protection standard which can be used to assess and build data governance models in countries like China, which have been a leader in personal data leak or privacy breach of internet users. Data exports from the EU to China is large owing to transfers to Chinese firms like TikTok, Alibaba, etc.

Thus, if the CJEU ruling is also enforced in countries like China, it will help in better understanding the economic implications of stronger data protection laws.

Further, several countries like the UK and Israel conduct extensive surveillance of personal data for national security purposes. The CJEU ruling has reopened questions as to the sufficiency of data protection in these regions as well.


Invalidation of the privacy-shield in the Schrems II ruling can lead to two possible scenarios in the future. The U.S. companies which rely on the E.U. data can continue with cross-border data flow from the EU based on SCCs, or the two countries will negotiate a successor to the E.U.-U.S. privacy shield. However, at present, there is complexity and uncertainty with respect to how quickly the transition has to be made to remain compliant to EU laws, the economic implications of the decision for smaller firms, and the risk of getting penalised by the EU regulators for lack of clear guidelines on adequate measures for data protection.

Case Reviews, The Law

Vineeta Sharma V. Rakesh Sharma

The Supreme Court in its landmark judgment on August 24, 2020, declared the equal position of woman as a coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family. The father’s death does not affect the right of the daughter as a coparcener because the coparcenary right is a birth right. 

By: Asif Choudhary, 2nd Year LLB Student, Delhi University.

Bench: Justice Arun Mishra, Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Justice M.R. Shah

Facts of the case:

The facts of the case as, One Ms. Vineeta Sharma (Appellant) filed a case against her two brothers Mr. Rakesh Sharma & Satyendra Sharma, and her father Sh. Dev Dutt Sharma (respondent). He expired on December 11, 1999. One of his sons expired on July 1, 2001 (unmarried). The Appellant claimed that being the daughter she was entitled to ¼ of the share in the property of her father. The case of the Respondents was that after her marriage, she ceased to be a member of the Joint family. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court disposed of the appeal as the amendments of 2005 did not benefit the Appellant as the father of the Appellant passed away on December 11, 1999.

Now, this case reached before the supreme court, but before this case, there are two major cases on the same grounds for which the divisional bench already rendered verdicts. The two cases are;

  • Prakash & Ors. v. Phulavati & Ors

In this case, the court held that section 6 is not retrospective in operation, and it applies when both coparceners and his daughter were alive on the date of commencement of Amendment Act, 9th, September 2005

  • Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar & Ors.

In this case, the court held that the amended provisions of section 6 confer full rights upon the daughter coparcener.

Stated that any coparcener including a daughter can claim a partition in the coparcenary property, even the coparcener’s father was not alive when the substituted provision of section 6 of HAS come into force. The daughters, sons, and the widow were given his/her shares.

Due to these two conflicting verdicts, this case was given to the larger bench of the supreme court headed by Justice Arun Mishra, with two other Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice M.R. Shah.

Issues before the court:

  • Whether the death of the father before amendment 2005, affects the daughter’s right over the property?
  • Whether the application of amendment 2005 be retrospective?

Rules applied:

Section 6 Hindu Succession Act 1956

The judgment of the court:

Before the amendment of 2005 under the Hindu Succession Act (HAS), the rule of survivorship existed and under that rule, the males were coparceners up to 4th generation only, the females were not able to qualify for coparceners. After the amendment, the rule of survivorship had been cancelled out and two major-heads to be considered for the partition of property that is “Testamentary and Interstate” so after that the daughters are also coparceners in her father’s inherited property and have equal liability same as sons. The fathers are free to pass his self-acquired property to anyone even someone out from the family with effect from 9th September 2005.

The term ‘coparcener’ is not defined in the Succession Act. This Court considered it in Sathyaprema Manjunatha Gowda (Smt) v. Controller of Estate Duty, Karnataka.

It is a narrower body than a joint family and consists of only those persons who have taken by birth, an interest in the property, and can enforce a partition, whenever they like.

The 174th Report of Law Commission of India recommended the adoption of the Kerala Model, and the amendments were affected in Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and in several States, giving coparcenary rights to the daughters.

This case emphasizes the nature of the 2005 amendment in sec 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. The amendment applies retrospectively to provide benefits conditional arising even before the passing of such legislation. 

The effect of an amendment can be seen in a manner that any action triggering partition before amendment only affects the extent of share, not the right to claim. In other words, if the partition is crystallized no change will be done in respect of amendment but if the partition isn’t done the daughter’s right to claim to remain intact.

The Hindu branch of dharma is influenced by the theological tenets of the Vedic Aryans. What is not modified or abrogated by the legislation or constitutional provisions still prevails, the basic Hindu law emanates from Vedas and past shrutis/smritis. Various dharma shastras regard custom as the basis of Hindu law as administered from time to time. Law has advanced and made progress as per the requirements of the society and the prevailing ethos. The justice used to be administered by the emperors resolving the conflicts. The building of law has taken place over time. There are two main schools of Hindu law, i.e., Mitakshara and Dayabhaga. Mitakshara law applies to most parts of India except Bengal.

As per the Mitakshara law, no coparcener has any fixed share. It keeps on fluctuating by birth or by death. It is the said principle of administration of Mitakshara coparcenary carried forward in statutory provisions of section 6. Even if a coparcener had left behind a female heir of Class I or a male claiming through such female Class I heir, there is no disruption of coparcenary by statutory fiction of partition. Fiction is only for ascertaining the share of a deceased coparcener, which would be allotted to him as and when actual partition takes place. The deemed fiction of partition is for that limited purpose. The classic Shastris Hindu law excluded the daughter from being coparcener, which injustice has now been done away with by amending the provisions in consonance with the spirit of the Constitution.

The judgment emphasized irrespective of the survivorship of the father, the Daughter acquire the right of the coparcener from birth and other related rights. While giving a contrary view in this case.

The Hon’ble Court held that irrespective of the life of the father, the daughter gets her right as coparceners.

In this manner the court was overruled the two verdicts i.e. Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju & Ors as irrespective of the living status of the father, the daughter gets the coparcenary right from birth. 

Giving the daughter equal coparcenary rights aligns with the spirit of equality, under Article 14 of the Indian constitution.

Case Reviews, The Law

Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India V. Subhash Chandra Agarwal

The judgment affirmed that the Supreme Court is a public office and is under the purview of RTI. It focused on public accountability and public interest at large which will lead to effective working and transparency along with the protection of personal information, privacy, and confidentiality of judges, It explained sec 8(1)(e) and  Sec 11 which is related to safeguard the confidential, personal and third party data. It opened doors for greater transparency while safeguarding third party data.

By: Anukriti Mathur 

CITATION: CA 10044/2010

BENCH: Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justice Deepak Gupta, Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, and Justice NV Ramana


The appointment of Justices HL Dattu, AK Ganguly, and RM Lodha while senior judges Justices AP Shah, AK Patnaik, and VK Gupta were superseded lead to various RTI applications filed before CIC for disclosure of correspondence between Collegium and Government for this matter. A CIC order was passed for such disclosure on an application filed by Activist Subhash Chandra Agarwal in Nov 2009. Such order was appealed and stayed by order of 4th Dec 2009

A similar issue arose in Jan 2009, before Delhi HC disclose information about judges’ assets. On 2nd Sept 2009, Supreme Court’s CPIO challenged CIC’s order before Justice Ravindra Bhat, who upheld CIC’s order. In Jan 2010, CPIO appealed to Supreme Court before Two judge bench on 26th Nov 2010 which was further referred to as the larger bench. On 17th August 2018, the bench of then CJI Ranjan Gogoi retired Justice Prafulla C Pant, and Justice AM Khanwilkar referred it to the constitutional bench over questions of independence or judiciary and right to privacy. The bench decided the matter on 4th April 2019 but reserved it and the final decision was pronounced on 13th Nov 2019


1. Does public disclosure of information held by the office of the CJI and collegium curtail the independence of the judiciary?

2. Does Section 8(i)(e) and/or (j) of the RTI Act exempt the CJI from public disclosure of information, on the grounds of protecting fiduciary and personal information?

3. Would disclose information pertaining to Collegium decision-making, prevent Collegium members from deliberating freely and frankly?


 Sec 8(i)(e), (j) and 11 of Right To Information Act 2005


 The APPELLANTS argued the following points:

  • Disclosure of communication will unnecessarily lead to intervention in the smooth working of court and the right to information isn’t an absolute right but subject to Protection of private data and confidentiality.
  • The communication among judges in judicial appointments and such disclosure might be futile on the independence of the judiciary and protected under sec 8(1)(e) and information related to assets of judges are protected under sec 8(1)(j).

The information on assets is voluntarily declared by the judges to the Chief Justice of India in his fiduciary capacity as the pater familias of the judiciary.

The RESPONDENT argued the following points:

  • The disclosure of information will not undermine judicial independence but will lead to transparency in the judiciary.
  • The public interest involves outweigh any exemption under sec 8(1)(e) of privacy and confidentiality and the mere existence of a fiduciary relationship does not bar disclosures.
  • Being public servants, The judges of the Supreme Court owe a duty towards citizens and a check over these duties by bona fide disclosure is a boon.1

And no fiduciary relationship is greater than the duty of service towards the citizen.


  • JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA authored the majority decision while covering the following aspects:
  • On the issue of separate entity of SC and office or CJI and other judges, the bench held that SC is a public authority in the ambit of Sec 2(h) RTI Act as established by the Indian Constitution under Art 124 and the office of CJI and other judges are inclusive in SC making the office of CJI as a public authority 
  • Information is material in any form accessible, held, and controlled by public authority. Reliance was placed on the black’s law dictionary to explain the word ‘hold’ which signifies to keep, retain, maintain, possess, or have authority over. This includes not only physical control but an appropriate connection of that information with the said authority. 
  • Section 3 point out that right to information isn’t absolute but a right with restriction. When any information is asked for it is necessary to balance the right to privacy and public accountability and no information of confidential nature or which violates effective working more than a justification of public interest should be disclosed.3 The sec 8-11 of the RTI Act is a safeguard for the same and it classifies exemptions as absolute and qualified. In the case in hand, the fiduciary relationship between judges is fiduciary and qualifies under sec 8(1)(e), so be disclosed when larger public interest comes to play. 
  • The fiduciary relationship is understood as a capacity in reference to a specific beneficiary who is expected to be protected by certain action4. The rules of No Conflict, No profit, Undivided Loyalty, and duty of confidentiality oblige the people under such relation to having stricter obligations. The judges of the Supreme court share a fiduciary relationship and disclosure of such communication will depend on tests and parameter expressed for that particular situation.

Section 8 and 11 of the RTI Act protect the disclosure of information which may lead to violation of privacy and confidentiality to harmonize these rights with effective governance.

  • The court while commenting on sec 8 noted that court documents may contain a name, address, physical, mental and psychological status, medical records, finding records, etc., which are personal information entitled to protection from unwarranted invasion of privacy but can be accessed in larger public interest is involved. Similarly, sec 11, which deals with third party information needs to create an equilibrium with the harm of disclosure of such third party data with authoritative answerability.5. The disclosure of the information is highly dependent on if the right to access or the right to know outweighs the harm or injury caused to the third party when such information is confidential. 6 
  • The word ‘public interest’ is used repeatedly and defining it becomes necessary for establishing the boundaries. The court in interpreting ‘public interest’ emphasized on object and purpose of such disclosure and weighing the breach of privacy and confidentiality over the greater good associated.7 The stress is placed on weigh in favour of public accountability, public health, safety, International relation, Integrity, etc.
  • The PIO while disclosing the information regarding the RTI application must examine possible harm and injury to a third party on disclosure of such information. The vexatious motive or an application filed merely to abuse the power should be dealt with iron hands.
  • The other obstacle in the disclosure of information is Judicial independence and the need for transparency in judicial appointments. The arguments against non-inclusion of CJI’s office under RTI were confidentiality concern, data protection, the reputation of the selection committee, public scrutiny of future candidates. The independence of the judiciary includes judicial appointments as well as economic, social, and political concerns involved8. So, whenever the information is disclosed it must be an indicator of public interest and judicial independence. The existence of a fiduciary relationship among judges’ privacy and right to protect the personal information of judges need to be studied in light of Sec 8(1)(e) read with sec 11of the RTI Act and due procedure must be followed.
  • JUSTICE DY CHANDRACHUD in his concurring opinion emphasized on public accountability of CJI and other judge’s offices. In his opinion, such disclosure will bring more transparency and not dilute the independence or fiduciary relationship among judges. He threw light on the duty of loyalty, candour, disclosure, and accounting towards the citizens. He too stressed on balance between privacy and public interest along with curbing malicious applications.
  • JUSTICE NV RAMANA too agreed with fair disclosure but show his disquiet towards RTI applications which are just tool of surveillance to scuttle effective functioning of the judiciary. 


The decision is authoritative and of binding nature and extended the scope of accessing information through RTI application to the Supreme court. However, concerns have been raised on Justice Ramana’s statement that RTI is used here as a tool of surveillance and scuttle functioning of the judiciary. The word ‘Motive’ behind seeking application is considered as a discretionary power in the hand of PIO to refuse applications and confidentiality in public office are highly controversial topics for the judgment.

Justice NV Ramana was highly criticized in light of the accountability of public office. The element of public interest in the disclosure of information depends highly on the motive for which it is sought. The judgment will balance the privacy and dignity of the court along with judicial transparency and right to know. The positions and salary of PIO are subject to the pleasure of the centre along with the word ‘disclosure in public interest’ which may act as a hurdle to the efficiency of the RTI process which is a matter of grave concern


  • Central Board of Secondary Education and another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and others (2011) 8 SCC 497
  • Reserve Bank of India v. Jayantilal N. Mistry (2016) 3 SCC 525
  • Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited v. State of Kerala and others (2013) 16 SCC 82
  • Aditya Bandopadhyay case
  • Commonwealth v. John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39
  • Attorney General (UK) v. Heinemann Publishers Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86
  • Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and Another, (2012) 13 SCC 61
  • Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1
Internship Experiences, The Law

Internship Experience at J.D. Legal and Associates.

By: Pooja Makarand Mujumdar, ILS Law College, 2nd year LL.M. (2018-2020) (Last semester of LLM postponed due to Covid-19)

Name and address of the employer

Adv. Prasad Jadhav, J.D. Legal and associates, Shop no.22, Anusaya enclave, Jagtap Chowk, Wanawadi, Pune 411040.

Duration of Internship

The duration of my internship was about 2 months. It was from 1st Nov 2019 to 31st December 2019. 

Application Procedure

There is no hard and fast application procedure for the internship as such. I heard of their office from some common friends from other law schools. You can take an appointment, visit the office, and get interviewed by the lawyers if you are interested to intern. 

Major role and Responsibilities

  • Assisting in case briefs.
  • Attending court sessions regularly for getting dates, hearings, and taking notes.
  • Reading and analyzing cases. 
  • Researching the ongoing cases.

Working Environment

The working environment was very friendly. All the partners and the associates were very co-operative. I got to learn a lot of new things while working. Everyone is very helpful and friendly. There is no strict work pressure and un-ending deadlines so one can work very freely. 

The highlight of the Internship

Reading about IPC and CPC in our LLB and actual practical working of the court are two very different things. Thus, you can get to learn a lot of what is practically done in court, how to draft notices, etc. Managing the work, dates, and cases of various clients is what you can learn while interning for an advocate working in a District Court & High Court. 

Overall Experience 

The overall experience of the internship was very good. Due to regular visits to the courts, one gets familiar with the working. The office mainly deals with a variety of civil cases so you get to learn a lot. The overall experience was good because everyone is very co-operative and friendly and can give you proper guidance in matters. Also, the office timings are flexible so you can work part-time while doing your LL.B.

Required skillsets

One must know how the civil court works. One must be through with their knowledge of civil matters. You will learn the know-how and day-to-day practical working of the district court.   

Whether the firm provides an extension or whether there is a policy of only a one-month internship?

There is no particular strict policy that one can intern only for one month. The lawyers can allow you to work longer than that as the work involved is of day-to-day court work.  

Suggestions for accommodation/places to chill

There are girl’s hostels and many paying guests’ services available in Wanawadi. There are also many cafes and hotels to chill and eat around the office.

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