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Legislations, The Law

The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Ordinance, 2020.

On 5th June 2020, the President of India promulgated ‘The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Ordinance, 2020’ which has been passed by both the Houses of the Parliament during the ongoing monsoon session.

By: Hanoon Vahab, BBA L.LB 3rd year, Geeta Institute of law

Objectives of the ordinance:

1. To provide freedom of choice to farmers and traders concerning the sale and purchase of farmers’ produce.

2. To promote efficient, transparent, and barrier-free inter-state and intra-state trade & commerce.

3. To provide a facilitative framework for electronic trading.

Key points of the ordinance:

1. Trade of Farmers’ Produce : 

The ordinance allows intra-state and inter-state trade of farmers’ produce outside by providing:

  1. The market committee formed under the state APMC acts runs the physical premises of the market.
  2.  Trade can be conducted in other markets notified under the state APMC act such as: 
  • (i) Farm gates
  • (ii) Factory premises
  • (iii) Warehouses
  • (iv) Silos
  • (v) Cold storage

2. Electronic Trading

The ordinance permits the electronic trading of scheduled farmers’ produce in the specified areas in the following manner:

  1. E-platform is set up to facilitate the direct and online purchase and selling of scheduled farmers’ products through electronic devices.
  2. E-platforms of scheduled farmers’ product can be established and operated by:
  • (i) Companies
  • (ii) Partnership firms
  • (iii) Registered societies
  • (iv) Any other trader having permanent account numbers under the Income Tax Act, 1961, or any other document notified by the central government.
  • (v) A farmer producer organization.

3. Market Fee Abolished :

The ordinance prohibits the state government from levying any market fee, cess, or levy on farmers, traders, and electronic trading platforms for trade and commerce in scheduled farmers’ produce in a trade area.

What is Farmer’s Produce?

The definition of farmers’ produce under section 2 (a) of The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Ordinance, 2020 states that:

(a) Farmers’ produce means –

  1. Foodstuff including cereals like wheat, rice, or other coarse grains, pulses, edible oilseed, oils vegetables, fruits, nuts, spices, sugarcane, and products of poultry, piggery, goatery, fishery, and dairy intended for human consumption in its natural or processed form.
  2. Cattle fodder including oil cakes and other concentrates; and
  3. Raw cotton whether ginned or unginned, cotton seeds, and raw jute.

Trade and Commerce of Farmers’ produce 

  • The ordinance ensures freedom to conduct trade (inter-state or intra-state) and Commerce in a trade area. 
  • Any trader may engage in the inter-state or intra-state trade of scheduled farmers’ produce with farmer or trader in a trade area.
  • The definition of Scheduled Farmers’ Produce under section 2 (J) of The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Ordinance, 2020 states that Scheduled farmers’ produce means the agricultural produce specified under any state APMC act or regulation.

Trade and commerce in lieu of public interest:

In such a case, the central government may prescribe a system for electronic registration for traders, modalities for trade transaction, and mode of payment of the scheduled farmers’ produce in a trade area,

wherein the payment has to be made either on the same day or maximum within the 3 working days.

Who are competent to E-trade?

  1. Any person (other than an individual) having a permanent account number allotted under the Income Tax Act 1961 or other documents as notified by the central government.
  2. Any farmer producer organization 
  3. Agricultural cooperative society 
  • The ordinance restricts State Government from levying market fees under state APMC or any other state law in the trade area.

The ordinance provides the authority to Central Government to develop a Price Information and Market Intelligence System and appoint any person owning and operating E-trade to provide such information.

Dispute Resolution between the farmer and a trader

  • Composition of the Board of Conciliation
  1. It shall consist of a chairperson; who shall be an officer serving under the supervision and control of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
  2. Members shall not be less than 2 and not more than 4; who shall be appointed in equal numbers to represent the parties to the dispute on the recommendation of such parties, as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate may deem fit.
  • Procedure to resolve the dispute

1. Parties to the dispute, through conciliation, can file an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who will further refer the matter to a Conciliation Board regarding the same.

2. During Conciliation Proceedings, a Memorandum of Settlement signed by the parties to the dispute shall be drawn and it should be binding upon them.

3. If such parties are unable to resolve the dispute within 30 days, they may approach the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to resolve the same.

4. The Sub-Divisional Authority, on its motion or in a petition or on the reference from any government agencies, can take action in that regard within 30 days from the date of its filing by giving the parties an opportunity of being heard.

5. Any party aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Authority can prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority within 30 days of such an order.

6. The manner and procedure for filing a petition or an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Authority and Appellate Authority respectively shall be such as may be prescribed.

  • The ordinance also provides for the provisions concerning the Suspension or Cancellation of the right to operate in electronic trading and transaction platform along with the Right to Appeal against the same.
  • It contains the provisions regarding Penalties for Contravention of Ordinance and Rules.
  • The ordinance provides for the Protection of action taken in good faith.
  • The ordinance gives power to the Central Government to make rules under sections 4(2),m4(3),8(10),9(2),10(2),10(3), and any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed.
  • The ordinance provides for Laying of Rules and Powers to remove difficulties by the Central Government by notifying in the official gazette and after the approval of both Houses of the Parliament.

An exception to the ordinance:

The ordinance shall not apply to the Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations recognized under the Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act, 1956.

Case Reviews, The Law

Purushottam v. Anil & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.4664 of 2018)

The case deals with Sections 11 (3) & 85 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 & Sections  7 & 10 of  The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in lieu of the rejection of the application of the appellant, the requirements as to the completion of the Arbitration Agreement, and the provisions regarding the appointment of the third arbitrator instead of the appointment of even number of arbitrators. With the enforcement of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Arbitration Act of 1940 was repealed, which is why the same cannot be considered unless arbitral proceeding commences before the enforcement of the 1996 Act.

By: Hanoon Vahab, BBA LLB, Geeta Institute of Law.

Background:

The rejection of application preferred by the appellant u/s 8 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 as affirmed by the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur by its judgment & order dated December 10, 2015, in Civil Revision Application, is under challenge in this appeal. 

Facts:

  • On November 9, 2005, the appellant and the respondents had entered into a partnership agreement, wherein clause 15 of the agreement stated that in case of any dispute between them, the same shall be dealt with by following the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act 1940.1
  • On December 28, 2006, the appellant executed a registered Power of Attorney in favor of the partners.
  • In April 2014, the respondents filed Special Civil Suit for declaration, damages, accounts, and permanent injunction against the appellant.
  • The appellant, after receiving the notice, preferred an application u/s 8 of the1996 Act.2
  • On January 5, 2015, the application of the appellant was rejected by the trial court, thereby declaring clause 15 as vague.3
  • In 2015, the appellant further filed a Civil Revision Application in the High Court.
  • Under Section 85 of the 1996 Act4, three enactments including the 1940 Act was repealed. Moreover, the repealed enactment namely the 1940 Act would continue to apply concerning arbitral proceedings which had commenced before the 1996 Act came into force.
  • The appellant and the respondent had nominated their arbitrators.
  • The appellant and the respondent appointed the arbitrators namely, Justice M.N Chandurkar, and Justice S.P. Sapra respectively; but failed to appoint the third arbitrator which is in contrast with Section 11(3) Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.5
  • Notwithstanding, as per Section 7 of the 1996 Act, the basic requirements for an arbitration agreement are certainly satisfied in the present matter.
  • The High Court concluded that there could be no arbitration at all in the instant case and thereby, rejected the application filed by the appellant.

Issues:

  • Whether reference to the 1940 Act in the agreement would have any bearing or not?
  • Whether there exists anything in the new Act to make such an agreement unenforceable?

Precedents:

  • Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH v. Steel Authority of India6

Referring to the judgment of this case, it can be seen that if the arbitration proceeding had not commenced under the Act of 1940 till the Act of 1996 came into force, the same could not be commenced thereafter.

It was further observed that there is a bar to agree to the applicability of the Act of 1940 after the Act of 1996 has come into force.

  • Rajan Kumar Verma And Anr. vs Sachchidanand Singh7

In context to this judgment, the High Court thus rejected the challenge and dismissed the said Civil Revision by its judgment under appeal.

  • M.M.T.C Limited v. Sterlite Industries (India) Limited8

Referring to this judgment, the arbitration agreement was of a date before the commencement of the 1996 Act while the arbitral proceedings commenced after the enforcement of the Act of 1996. Therefore, it was held that the provisions of the 1996 Act would apply.

Rules:

  1. The Arbitration Act, 1940
  2. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1960

Arguments Advanced:

Appellant

  • The Appellant contended, referring to the Act of 1940 in the partnership deed in 2005, it has to be necessarily referred to the arbitration process as prevalent in the date of signing of the Agreement.
  • He further argued that the mention of the 1940 Act will not deceit the intention of the parties to go for arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.


An Arbitration Agreement providing for the appointment of an even number of arbitrators is not valid because of Section 10(1) of the new Act.9

  • The provision for the number of arbitrators is a machinery provision and does not affect the validity of the Arbitration Agreement which is to be determined according to section 7 of the New Act.10

Respondent

  • The respondent submitted that the question as to whether the 1996 Act or the 1940 Act would govern the relationship between the parties was so fundamental that mistakes in that behalf would invalidate the entire Arbitration clause.

He contended there is no such inconsistency between Section 10 of the new Act and the corresponding provision in the 1940 Act as both being substantially the same.

  • The provision of the new Act must be construed to promote the object of implementing the scheme of alternative dispute resolution; and the New Act must be construed to enable the enforcement of the earlier arbitration agreement.

Decision:

The decision set aside the judgment & order passed by the High Court & accepted the appeal preferred by the appellant.

The matter, however, will have to be dealt with by the trial court in the context of Section 8 of the 1996 Act.

Endnotes:

  1. Clause 15 of the partnership agreement 2005- That in case of any dispute between the partners as regards the interpretation of this Deed or any other matter connected with the partnership business, the same shall be referred to for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, and the decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on all the partners.
  2. Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.
  3. As there was no reference as to who should the arbitrator; there was no mention about the selection of the arbitrators and the dispute didn’t form the subject matter of agreement within the meaning of section 8 of the 1996 Act.
  4. Repeal and savings – (1) The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 (45 of 1961) are hereby repealed.
  5. Section 11(3) Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996Where an arbitrator or umpire is removed under this section, he shall not be entitled to receive any remuneration in respect of his services.
  6. Thyssen StahlunionGmbh Etc vs Steel Authority Of India Ltd on 7 October 1999.
  7. Rajan Kumar Verma And Anr. vs Sachchidanand Singh on 22 September 2005 AIR 2006 Pat 1. 
  8. M.M.T.C. Limited vs Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. on 18 November, 19961996 IXAD SC25.
  9. Section 10 is a departure from para 2 of the first schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940The provision for the number of arbitrators is a machinery provision and does not affect the validity of the Arbitration Agreement which is to be determined according to section 7 of the New Act.
  10. Section 7 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Case Reviews, The Law

Anuradha Bhasin and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 637

Constitution of India- Right to Freedom- Article19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(g), Article 19(6). Right to Internet is a fundamental right.

By: Sakshi Jain, 3rd Year LL.B., ILS Law College, Pune.

Facts of the case:

The issue starts with the security advisory issued by the Civil Secretariat, Home Department, Government of Jammu and Kashmir stating to cut short their stay and make safe arrangements to go back. Subsequently, educational institutions and offices were also shut down until further orders.

On August 4, 2019 internet services, mobile connectivity, and landline were shut down until further orders. [i]

On August 5, 2019, the Constitutional Order No. 272 was passed by the President of India applying all provisions of the Constitution of India to Jammu and Kashmir and stripped it from special status enjoyed since 1954.

On the same day, due to prevailing circumstances, the District Magistrate passed the order restricting the movement and public gathering, apprehending breach of peace and tranquillity under Section 144 of CrPC.  Due to this, journalist movements were restricted and this was challenged under Article 19 of the Constitution

which guarantees freedom of speech and expression and freedom to carry any trade or occupation.[ii]

In this context, in the Supreme Court, the legality of internet shutdown and movement restrictions are challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether the freedom of speech and expression and freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business over the Internet is a part of the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution?

2. Whether the Government’s action of prohibiting internet access is valid?

Rules:

In light of prevailing circumstances, District Magistrates, apprehending imposed restrictions on movement and public gatherings under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Arguments Advanced:

Senior Counsel for the Petitioner- It was submitted that the conduct of the State, in producing documents and status reports during argumentation, was improper, as it did not allow the Petitioners with sufficient opportunity to rebut the same. Concerning the orders restricting movement passed Under Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned senior Counsel contended that such an order is made to deal with a ‘law and order’ situation, but the orders do not indicate any existing law and order issue, or apprehension thereof.

Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Learned Attorney General for the Union of India-

According to the learned Attorney General, keeping in mind the facts regarding cross border terrorism and internal militancy, it would have been foolish to have not taken any preventive measures in the circumstances.

The necessity of the orders Under Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure is apparent from the background facts and circumstances when there can be huge violence if the Government did not take these kinds of measures. Similar steps were taken earlier by the Government in 2016 when a terrorist was killed in the State.

Decision:

The bench of Justices N.V. Ramana, R. Subhash Reddy, and B.R. Gavai declared that the freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to practice any profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation over the medium of Internet enjoys constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(g) respectively.

While such freedom is not absolute, the restrictions imposed on it should align with the mandate under Article 19(2) and Article 19(6) of the Constitution, inclusive of the test of proportionality, the bench ruled. The judgment to some extent is paradoxical.[iii]

Court added that “a democracy, which is sworn to transparency and accountability, necessarily mandates the production of orders as it is the right of an individual to know.” This obliges the state to protect the fundamental rights and does not away from them in a cavalier manner.

Further said, that state cannot clandestinely pass any law on mere apprehension of danger.

To this, the court adds that James Madison stated “a popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives”. The court should take proactive orders in producing before the court unless there is a special privilege or countervailing public interest. But then, this is to be decided by the court that in every case according to the facts and circumstances that public interest or privilege can override the rights of the petitioner and that part of the order can be redacted. In the present case, initially the state privilege but later on produced some orders citing some difficulty in producing all the orders. Hence, this cannot be a valid ground or reason to refuse to produce the order. [iv]

Therefore, the ‘right to internet’ is a part of the fundamental right under Article 19 of the constitution.

Precedents:

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (24.08.2017 – SC) : MANU/SC/1044/2017. Right to privacy was held to be a fundamental right under Article 21 of the constitution.

End Notes:

  1. Rishita Gupta, Ayush Verma, Anuradha Bhasin vs. Union of India- Case Analysis, IPLEADERS (April 15, 2020), https://blog.ipleaders.in/anuradha-bhasin-v-union-of-india-case-analysis/
  2. Rishita Gupta, Ayush Verma, Anuradha Bhasin vs. Union of India- Case Analysis, IPLEADERS (April 15, 2020), https://blog.ipleaders.in/anuradha-bhasin-v-union-of-india-case-analysis/
  3. V. Venkatesan, Verdict on Internet curbs in J&K in defence of free speech, but relief remains elusive, FRONTLINE(January 11, 2020 14:58 IST), https://frontline.thehindu.com/dispatches/article30542427.ece
  4. Rishita Gupta, Ayush Verma, Anuradha Bhasin vs. Union of India- Case Analysis, IPLEADERS (April 15, 2020), https://blog.ipleaders.in/anuradha-bhasin-v-union-of-india-case-analysis/

Case Reviews, The Law

K. Padma Reddy V. Station House Officer and others 2003 (5) ALD 345

Mere abusing someone on the basis of caste in a private place does not amount to offence under Section 3(1)(x) of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

By: Himanshi Jain, Final Year LL.B. Student at Balaji Law College, Pune.

Facts of the Case:

  • The petitioner claims to be the President of the Community Development Society of Bellampalli Municipality, Adilabad District which was established in the year 1998, as part of a Central Government sponsored Scheme.
  • The petitioner was preparing a list for selection of certain Groups for implementation of the Mid-day Meal scheme and when the list of selected groups was about to be typed, the 3rd respondent entered the Chambers of the Chair-person in an intoxicated state and abused her and also prevented her from preparing the list.
  • She immediately called the police and the 3rd respondent was sent for medical examination which revealed that he was in an intoxicated condition.
  • The 3rd respondent submitted a complaint the next day alleging that the petitioner had abused him in the name of Caste and thereby committed an offense under Section 3(1)(x) of Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
  • A counter-affidavit is filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2
  • The 3rd respondent also filed his counter-affidavit stating that the matter has been settled between him and the petitioner.
  • Although a counter-affidavit was filled by respondent 3, the complaint was made under Section 3(1)(x) of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 which is non- compoundable, thus the adjudication of the matter does not depend on the version presented by the 3rd respondent; irrespective of the justification thereof.

Issues:

  • Does insulting a member of Schedule Cast or Schedule Tribe in personal chamber amount to humiliation under S. 3(1)(x) of The Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989?

Rules:

  • Section 3(1)(x) of Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Judgment:

The Court held that mere utterances in the name of Caste would not attract the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; unless these utterances were made at any place that comes within public view.

The utterances were made within the Chambers of the Municipal Commissioner, which does not come under the purview of public view. 

The Court also stated that every utterance which comes within the purview of this provision by itself is not an offence unless it is made in any place within public view.

Conclusion:

Mere abusing someone on the basis of caste in a private place does not amount to offence under Section 3(1)(x) of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

When you are abusing someone in a place where there is no other person, i.e. a private place, the image of that person is not getting defamed as no one saw or heard what happened. Section 3(1)(x) of the said Act won’t come into the picture because of the absence of ‘public view’.

Case Reviews, The Law

State of U.P. V. Santosh Kumar (2009)

Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC are both distinct and separate offenses. The demand for dowry is an essential ingredient in section 304-B IPC, whereas under section 498-A IPC the demand for dowry is not the essential ingredient. Thus, even if there is acquittal under section 304-B IPC, a conviction under section 498A can be made.

By: Himanshi Jain, Final Year LL.B. Student at Balaji Law College, Pune.

Facts of the Case:

  • Deceased was the daughter of Dhani Ram who was married to Ram Chandra. At the time of marriage, Dhani Ram gave dowry beyond his capacity but the in-laws were not satisfied and they harassed Sunita by regularly demanding dowry in the form of articles and money. Dhani Ram agreed to give dowry throughout his life on the condition that they should not harass his daughter. 
  • The deceased’s husband poured kerosene oil and lit the fire. Sunita cried for help and jumped into a water pond to save her life. On hearing her cry people took her out of the pond. She was alive at that time. 

Sunita’s father, Dhani Ram reached the spot of occurrence and she told him she had a fight with Santosh Kumar, he and others had beaten her, poured kerosene and set her on fire. 

  • The investigating officer reached the spot and the dying declaration was recorded under S. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the case diary by the Investigating Officer where Sunita said that earlier that day, she had a quarrel with her mother-in-law over 20Rs. Immediately after that her brother in law Santosh Kumar came and asked her what she has been doing in Bombay to which she replied ask from Bombay itself. Hearing this Santosh Kumar started beating her with fists and kicks. Deceased Sunita said to him that instead of killing her every day, why not to finish her at once. Then Santosh Kumar poured kerosene and set her on fire. She rushed towards her mother-in-law for help but she ignored her and thus she rushed and jumped into the pond to save her life. The officer also seized the container of kerosene oil, a piece of burnt dhoti, and broken bangles. He completed the necessary formalities and prepared a charge sheet.
  • The third dying declaration was given to Tehsildar/Magistrate Rajesh Kumar Shrivastava wherein deceased Sunita said that she had a quarrel with her mother-in-law. Immediately after that her brother in law Santosh Kumar came and asked her what she has been doing in Bombay to which she replied go and inquire from Bombay itself. Hearing this Santosh Kumar started beating him with fists and kicks. On exhortation by Prem Narain, Santosh Kumar brought a container of kerosene oil, poured on her, and set her on fire. 
  • Thus there were three dying declarations at different times having a considerable difference.
  • The trial court after analysis held that Santosh Kumar is not guilty under Section 304-B of IPC but is guilty under Section 302 & 498-A of IPC and 3,4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. And respondents Shiv Pyari and Prem Narain were convicted by the trial court under S. 498-A of IPC and S. 3 and of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
  • The appeal for Trial Court’s decision went to the High court.
  • The High Court acquitted all the respondents stating that when the charge under section 304-B IPC failed, then the appellants could not be convicted for offenses punishable under sections 3 and of the Dowry Prohibition Act as well as under section 498-A Indian Penal Code. 
  • The appeal for the High Court’s decision was filed. 

Issues:

  • Would three different dying declarations be considered valid?
  • Is there any interrelation between S. 304-B of IPC and Section 3,4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961? 

Rules:

  • Section 302/34, 304-B and 498-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 
  • Section 3,4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 read with S. 34 of IPC. 

Judgment:

The Supreme Court held that the decision of the High Court was palpably wrong and unsustainable. The ingredients of Section 498-A IPC and S. 3 and of the Dowry Prohibition Act are different from the ingredients of S. 304-B of IPC.

The court held that even if there were three different dying declarations, all of them lead to one conclusion that respondent Santosh Kumar had beaten deceased Sunita, poured kerosene oil on her, and set her on fire because of which she sustained burn injuries and died. All three declarations were recorded during different time periods thus minor inconsistencies are expected to occur.  

Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC are both distinct and separate offenses. The demand for dowry is an essential ingredient in section 304-B IPC, whereas under section 498-A IPC the demand for dowry is not the essential ingredient. Thus, even if there is acquittal under section 304-B IPC, a conviction under section 498A can be made.

Further, the ambit and scope of S.3 and of the Dowry Prohibition Act are different from the ambit and scope of section 498- A IPC. Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act deals with punishment for giving or taking dowry whereas Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act deals with penalty for demanding dowry either in a direct or indirect manner.  Section 4 prohibits the demand for `giving’ property or valuable security, of which demand if satisfied would be an offense under section 3 read with section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  

This appeal was thus allowed and was accordingly disposed of.

Precedent Cited:

State of Karnataka v. Balappa, the court has dealt with in great detail that even if the charge under section 304-B IPC is not made out, the conviction under section 498-A IPC can be recorded.

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